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Abstract: This paper is inspired by the many similarities between gendered welfare 
state research and demographic research on the determinants of fertility. The fi rst 
part of the paper discusses some of the theories on childbearing in the light of the 
gendered welfare state theory. One important similarity between these two genres 
is that when work-life choices are studied, the emphasis is on policies which enable 
women to reconcile employment and family. Support for informal care is accord-
ingly treated as having a negative infl uence on work-life compatibility, and women 
are moreover assumed to have homogeneous preferences, i.e., they are supposed 
to want to combine work and family. However, such an approach does not pay suf-
fi cient attention to informal care and to heterogeneity among women, either when 
it comes to preferences or to behaviour. To address these gaps, in the second part 
of the paper a new framework to analyse women’s work-life choices is developed. 
The suggested framework gives considerable attention to the way in which formal 
as well as informal care is supported or enforced in different welfare states and the 
consequences such support has on women’s decision making. Moreover, hetero-
geneity among women is emphasised, both in preferences and when it comes to 
behaviour. The central argument is that women’s heterogeneous preferences trans-
form differently to different lifestyle career strategies (with regard to employment 
and childbearing) in different welfare state settings, as each lifestyle strategy is en-
couraged or discouraged by family policy to differing degrees. Hence, the number 
of women who choose a particular strategy, as well as the level of fertility, varies 
between the welfare states. In addition, household resources are assumed to infl u-
ence the choices that are being made. The argument that is put forward is illustrated 
with recent data on family policy, women’s employment patterns and fertility in the 
social-democratic (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), conservative (Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and liberal 
welfare states (Australia, Canada, Ireland, the UK, the USA). Moreover, a reinterpre-
tation of the fi ndings on the relationship between family policy, female employment 
and fertility is provided in the light of the framework outlined. 
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1 Introduction
For a welfare state researcher, a quick look at total fertility rates (TFR) in the devel-
oped countries probably awakens thoughts of the striking resemblance between the 
welfare regime types and levels of period fertility: In general, the liberal and social 
democratic regimes experienced relatively high fertility during 1990-2010 (1.7-2.1), 
whereas the conservative regimes have struggled with low (below 1.5) or lowest-
low (below 1.3) fertility.1 However, there are some exceptions to this general rule. 
Most notably, fertility rates in Canada have been somewhat lower than in the other 
liberal countries. TFR in Belgium, France and the Netherlands has been only some-
what below or at the same levels as in the liberal and social democratic countries, 
and fi nally in Sweden the fertility rates have fl uctuated radically, and occasionally 
approached the 1.5 limit (OECD 2012).
Given the similarities between the welfare state types and levels of fertility, it is 
not surprising that a number of scholars engaged in the gendered2 welfare state 
study discuss the possibility that some welfare state arrangements have an impact 
on childbearing (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999; Bettio/Plantenga 2004; De Henau et al. 
2006; Fagnani 2007). During the past decades, the infl uence of family policy on fer-
tility has also been examined by demographers to an increasing extent (see section 
3 below). The question of whether and how family policy can infl uence fertility rates 
is naturally also of interest to decision makers, who in many countries are worried 
about sub-replacement fertility levels (UN 2010:7) and wish to take action to in-
crease childbearing (for Germany, see Henninger et al. 2008). However, despite the 
extensive discussion on the matter, our understanding of the relationship between 
family policy and fertility is still somewhat limited (Gauthier 2007; Neyer 2011).
In contemporary discussions the recipe for high fertility is often claimed, by 
both welfare state researchers and by demographers, to be generous family policy 
which enables the reconciliation of work and family (see sections 2 and 3). Such 
an approach nevertheless ignores two important issues: Firstly, women have het-
eregeneous preferences, varying from home-centeredness to work-centeredness, 
and women with different preferences will respond differently to different social 
policies (Hakim 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003a/b). Secondly, the concentration on policies 
which enable the reconciliation of work and family ignores the role of informal care, 
the cross-country variation in welfare state support it receives as well as the many 
changes that have taken place in this sphere (Pfau-Effi nger 2004, 2005).
This paper focuses on the relationship between family policy and fertility, and 
has two aims. Firstly, as the many similarities between gendered welfare state re-
search and research on fertility call for a comparison between these fi elds, after 
a short review of the gendered welfare state theories (section 2) we discuss how 
demographers can learn from gendered research on the welfare state (section 3). 
Secondly, a suggestion of how Hakim’s preference theory and feminist research on 
1 See section 4.1 for the list of countries included in each cluster.
2 “Gendered” and “feminist” are used as synonyms here.
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the welfare state can be combined into a new framework is put forward (section 4). 
The central argument made in the paper is that women’s heterogeneous prefer-
ences transform differently to different lifestyle career strategies (with regard to 
employment and childbearing) in different welfare state settings, as each lifestyle 
strategy is encouraged or discouraged by family policy to different degrees, and in 
addition infl uenced by household resources. Consequently, the number of women 
who choose a particular strategy, as well as the level of fertility, varies between 
the welfare states. These claims are illustrated with recent data on family policy, 
women’s employment patterns and fertility in social-democratic (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden), conservative (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and liberal countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, 
the UK, the USA). In addition, a brief reinterpretation of the fi ndings on the relation-
ship between family policy, female employment and fertility is provided (section 5). 
The paper ends with concluding remarks (section 6).
2 Women, families and welfare regimes
A useful starting point for a review of gendered welfare state research is provid-
ed by the intensive critique which Esping-Andersen (1990) received from feminist 
scholars after he had put forward his argument about the tripartite welfare regime 
typology. Esping-Andersen’s well known key idea is that there are qualitative dif-
ferences between the welfare states and that these differences can be analysed 
with help of three different indicators. Firstly, the extent of de-commodifi cation (i.e. 
welfare state protection of workers who are unable to earn their living on the labour 
market) varies between the welfare states. Secondly, there are cross-country differ-
ences concerning the most important provider of welfare in terms of state, market 
and family. Thirdly, due to the differences in the degree of de-commodifi cation and 
the interplay between state, market and family, different welfare states promote 
different patterns of social stratifi cation. The dissimilarities between the welfare 
states, analysed along these three dimensions, permit the countries to be classi-
fi ed into three clusters, each characterised by its own logic. In the Northern Euro-
pean social democratic regimes, the state is the major actor when it comes to de-
commodifi cation. The benefi ts are generous and universal, and the system tends 
to create social equality among citizens. In turn, the liberal Anglo-Saxon regimes 
only allot a minimal role to the state and rely heavily on market-based solutions, 
such as private insurance. The market-based practices, combined with a low degree 
of de-commodifi cation through the state, mainly to the very marginalised groups 
(means testing), maintain the socioeconomic differences between those who can 
afford market-based welfare and those who cannot. A third type of de-commod-
ifi cation is put into practice in the Western and Southern European conservative 
welfare regimes, where the state and the family take on the major responsibility. 
De-commodifi cation is provided based on the occupational status, and its extent 
varies accordingly, so that the system maintains the prevailing work-related status 
composition of the people.
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This elegant classifi cation of welfare states initiated a vivid discussion (for meth-
odological problems in Esping-Andersen’s work, see Obinger/Wagschal 1998; for a 
review, see Arts/Gelissen 2002). In particular, feminist researchers accused Esping-
Andersen of having based his classifi cation on male standards and of leaving wom-
en and the family outside the analysis. Indeed, the worker whom Esping-Andersen 
has in mind is one with market employment and, consequently, de-commodifi ca-
tion is not relevant for the large amount of women who work at home and are not 
commodifi ed. Further, unpaid household work is also done by women who are in 
market employment, but as this kind of work is excluded from Esping-Andersen’s 
conceptualisation, the typology unavoidably ignores the family as a provider of care 
and welfare. It is also worth noting that many housewives are not dependent on the 
labour market, but on their husbands, and their relation with the welfare state is de-
fi ned through their roles as mothers and/or wives (not as workers). Finally, women 
and families are treated differently in different welfare states, and hence welfare 
state arrangements do not only have an impact on the socioeconomic stratifi cation, 
as suggested by Esping-Andersen, but also on gender relations (Lewis 1992; Orloff 
1993; Ostner 1995; Anttonen/Sipilä 1996; Sainsbury 1994; and for a review, Lewis 
1997). In other words, the feminist critique concentrates on unpaid care work (e.g. 
Daly/Lewis 2000), which was largely ignored in Esping-Andersen’s presentation.
As a result of the feminist critique, Esping-Andersen (1999) integrated the fam-
ily dimension into his typology with two new concepts, “familialism” (state and 
market non-provision of welfare services) and “de-familialization”3 (the extent to 
which the welfare burden of the family is eased through state or market provision of 
services, or/and through the arrangements within the family). According to Esping-
Andersen, the high degree of familialism in the conservative countries discourages 
female employment, whereas de-familialization in the social demcoratic countries 
enables women to become commodifi ed. These new concepts do not change the 
original typology of the three welfare regime types, although Esping-Andersen ac-
knowledges that there are some differences between the Continental and Southern 
European countries. Most notably, the degree of de-familialization by the state and 
within the family is lower in the Continental European countries, child benefi ts are 
lower in the Southern European countries and, fi nally, the tax and transfers system 
in the Continental European countries creates disincentives for the second earner’s 
employment, whereas this is not the case in the Southern European countries.
Even Esping-Andersen’s gendered framework is sometimes claimed to be unsat-
isfactory (Knijn/Ostner 2002; Pfau-Effi nger 2004, 2005; Woods 2006; Leitner/Less-
enich 2007). In particular, Leitner (2003) puts forward a more nuanced framework 
of familialism and emphasises the fact that the state can either support the family in 
its caring function (familialization) or ease the welfare responsibilities of the family 
(de-familialization). Further, in Leitner’s framework the magnitude of familialization 
and de-familialization can be either strong or weak, which results in four differ-
3 Originally introduced to the research vocabulary by Lister (1994) and McLaughlin/Glendinning 
(1994).
Fertility, Family Policy and Welfare Regimes    • 127
ent combinations of familialism. However, instead of improving Esping-Andersen’s 
conceptualisations, many scholars have concentrated on the creation of completely 
new frameworks. Lewis and Ostner for example distinguish between three different 
types of breadwinner regimes, namely strong, modifi ed and weak (Lewis 1992; Os-
tner 1995). Further, Pfau-Effi nger (2004, 2005) emphasises the interaction between 
institutions and cultural factors and distinguishes between the dual breadwinner 
family model and the modernised male breadwinner model. Finally, some studies 
classify countries based on how they cluster when a particular statistical method is 
applied (Thévenon 2011).
The results of the above studies in terms of the countries belonging to the dif-
ferent clusters are found in Table 1. As can be read from the table, the number 
of clusters varies from three to fi ve and has remained relatively stable during the 
past two decades. In general, the Nordic as well as the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
the Continental European countries together with the Southern European coun-
tries, form one group each. There are some exceptions from this rule. Some stud-
ies have found Belgium and France to be more similar to the Nordic than to the 
Continental European countries (Leitner 2003; Pfau-Effi nger 2005), or they are even 
distinguished constituting a separate cluster (Lewis 1992; Ostner 1995). Southern 
European countries are likewise sometimes clustered into a separate cluster which 
is distinct from the Continental European countries due to the limited support for 
informal care (Leitner 2003; Thévenon 2011, but see also Esping-Andersen 1999). 
Moreover, in two cases the UK is classifi ed together with the Continental European 
countries which are biased towards informal care (Lewis 1992, Ostner 1995; Pfau-
Effi nger 2005), and one of these studies (Pfau-Effi nger 2005) also fi nds that Norway 
displays certain similarities with the Continental European countries.
In this context, it is important to remember that concentration on the general 
cross-country differences can sometimes overlook the many goals of family poli-
cy. Thévenon (2011) for example distinguishes between six different aims, namely 
poverty reduction and income maintenance, direct compensation for the economic 
costs of children, promotion of employment, promotion of gender equity, support 
for early childhood development and increasing fertility. These aims are adopted 
to differing degrees in different welfare state regimes, which also translates to the 
differences in the actual policies. For instance, gender equity and women’s em-
ployment are given the key role in the Northern European welfare states, whereas 
Anglo-Saxon countries prioritise poverty reduction and income maintenance. Fur-
thermore, the different policy goals may clash, which can result in inconsistencies. 
In Austria and Germany, for example, the reconciliation of work and family is to a 
certain extent supported by parental leave regulations, but at the same time the 
daycare system is underdeveloped since it has traditionally served the goal of early 
education (Leitner/Wroblewski 2006).
In addition to the country groupings and studies on social policy, many feminist 
scholars have contributed to the research by evaluating the gender stratifi cation 
of the welfare state and social policy against the standards of woman-friendliness 
(Hernes 1987/1989; for critique see Borchorst/Siim 2008), gender equality and gen-
der equity. In these contributions the welfare state is often considered to be the cen-
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tral actor which either encourages or discourages gender equity (Mazur 2002: 15). 
It is common that three different defi nitions of gender equity are applied. Probably 
the most profound argumentation on the issue is that provided by Fraser (1994), 
who discusses the types of gender equity along the lines of what she chooses to call 
the “universal breadwinner model”, where gender equity is striven for by promot-
ing female employment, and the “caregiver parity model”, where gender equity is 
promoted by supporting informal care work. Fraser herself concludes that neither 
Tab. 1: Family policy clusters
 I II III IV V 
Lewis (1992), Weak  Moderate Strong   
Ostner (1995) breadwinner: breadwinner: breadwinner:   
 Denmark Belgium Germany   
 Finland France Ireland   
 Sweden  Netherlands   
   UK   
Esping-Andersen Social- Liberal: Conservative:  
(1999) democratic:     
 Denmark Australia Continental Southern  
 Finland Canada Europe Europe  
 Norway Ireland Austria Italy  
 Sweden UK Belgium Portugal  
  USA France Spain  
   Germany   
   Netherlands   
Leitner (2003) Optional Explicit De-familialism: Implicit  
(childcare only) familialism: familialism:  familialism:  
 Belgium Austria Ireland Greece  
 Denmark Germany UK Portugal  
 Finland Italy  Spain  
 France Luxembourg    
 Sweden Netherlands    
Pfau-Effinger Dual breadwinner Modernisation of    
(2005) family model the male     
  breadwinner    
  model:    
 France UK    
 Denmark Norway    
 Sweden Netherlands    
 Finland Western Germany    
Thévenon (2011) Continuous High financial Short leave, Limited Long leave 
 strong support support, but support targeted assistance for but low cash 
 for working limited support to low-income families: benefits and 
 parents of for dual-earner single parent Greece childcare for 
 children under families with families and Italy children 
 age 3: children under families with Korea under age 3: 
 Denmark age 3: preschool Japan Czech Republic
 Finland Austria children: Portugal Hungary 
 Iceland Belgium Australia Spain Poland 
 Norway France Canada  Slovakia 
 Sweden Germany Ireland   
  Luxembourg New Zealand   
  Netherlands Switzerland   
   UK   
   USA   
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of the models is good enough as they do not require men to change and, conse-
quently, she claims that gender equity can be achieved only when men become 
more like women, i.e., when men also combine care-giving and employment. In 
practice, according to Pfau-Effi nger (2004, 2005), a somewhat evolutionary view of 
gender equity has dominated the research, that is a high proportion of public child-
care and female labour force participation (high degree of de-familialization) is seen 
as the woman-friendly and gender-equal alternative, whereas a low share of public 
child care and female employment (high degree of familialism) is understood as less 
women-friendly and gender equal. Pfau-Effi nger herself has criticised this approach 
by pointing out that there is evidence of several different paths which are taken to 
gender equity, and that the one-dimensional frameworks (such as familialization 
and de-familialization) are not adequate to capture current welfare state develop-
ments.
3 What lessons can demographers learn from gendered research on 
the welfare state?
In order to exemplify how demographers can benefi t from gendered welfare state 
research, this section compares the theories discussed above on the welfare state 
with two types of theories on fertility, namely the economic theory on fertility and 
gender equity and role incompatibility theories.
3.1 New home economics and welfare state institutions
The economic theory on fertility treats children as consumer durables and analyses 
household demand for children with the same tools as demand for any other dura-
ble. In this framework, the number of children is assumed to depend on a house-
hold’s preferences, the quality and quantity of children, household income and the 
costs of children (Becker 1960; Becker/Lewis 1973; Willis 1973; Becker 1981/1991). 
Women’s employment and thus their opportunity costs are in turn often presumed 
to infl uence fertility negatively. That is, the higher education and income, the higher 
the opportunity costs and the lower fertility.  
The importance of this theory for fertility research has been vast, but one of its 
drawbacks is that it ignores the fact that choices are made in national institutional 
contexts which differ substantially, as discussed above. Consequently, it is prob-
able that the economic theory, or at least research based on the theory, would ben-
efi t if the knowledge of gendered welfare state research were taken into account 
when it comes to the differences between the institutional logics in the treatment of 
the family. Many scholars already refer to welfare state literature when they make 
hypotheses or interpret the results (e.g. Köppen 2006; Brodmann et al. 2007). How-
ever, a more extensive discussion of the institutional constraints in different coun-
tries would enable more systematic context-specifi c hypothesising, and therefore 
also allow systematic predictions about the infl uence of the central variables on 
fertility in different types of welfare states.
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It is, for example, well known that women’s inactivity infl uences fertility positively 
at micro-level (Hoem/Hoem 1989; Berinde 1999; Oláh 2003; Cooke 2004; Kreyenfeld 
2004; Prskawetz/Zagaglia 2005; Cooke 2008; Breton/Prioux 2009). As the direction 
of the impact is well established, the possible differences in the magnitude of the 
effect should be discussed. The descriptive evidence provided by feminist scholars 
concerning the welfare state support for informal care could prove to be helpful 
here. A possible hypothesis could be, for instance, that in countries where the male 
breadwinner family is generously supported (e.g. Germany), the household income 
of families where the woman is inactive, and hence the fertility is higher, than in 
countries where practically no support is provided for male breadwinner families 
(e.g. Sweden). Other areas where the gendered welfare state theories might help in 
a similar manner to increase our understanding of the magnitude of the infl uence 
are for instance the negative impact of educational attainment on fi rst births (Krey-
enfeld 2004; Klein/Eckhard 2007; Westoff/Marshall 2010), and the mixed evidence 
of the impact of female income, varying from negative (Rønsen 2004; Rondinelli et 
al. 2010) to positive (Hoem 2000; Andersson 2000; Vikat 2004) and even U-shaped 
(Kreyenfeld/Zabel 2005) depending on the country and parity that are studied. With 
a similar logic, considerations of the interaction between welfare state institutions 
might help researchers to explain why certain variables sometimes behave contrary 
to expectations. For example, the weak support for the impact of family policy on 
fertility (Gauthier 2007) might be better understood by paying more attention to the 
welfare state institutions and especially to the consistency of family policies (e.g. 
Leitner/Wroblewski 2006).
3.2 Role compatibility, gender equity and de-familialization
The change in the macro-level association between female labour force participa-
tion and fertility from negative to positive in the mid-1980s (Ahn/Mira 2002; Rindfuss 
et al. 2003; but see also Castles 2003) inspired several scholars to theorise about the 
infl uence of family policy on fertility and women’s employment. For instance, Rind-
fuss and Brewster (1996), Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) and Rindfuss et al. (2003) 
argue that, whereas governments in some countries are better at implementing pol-
icies that reduce role incompatibility between market employment and parenthood, 
institutions in other countries have not adapted to the labour force participation of 
mothers. According to them, high role incompatibility leads to low participation and 
low fertility, whereas role compatibility leads to both high participation and high 
fertility. McDonald (2000a/b, 2002), in turn, claims that the size of the gap between 
gender equity in family-oriented institutions (institutions which deal with people 
as family members, such as joint taxation) and individual-oriented institutions (in-
stitutions which treat people as individuals, such as education and labour market) 
determines the level of fertility. According to McDonald, the levels of gender equity 
in the individual-oriented institutions are high at present in all developed countries. 
Those countries in which gender equity in the family-oriented institutions is likewise 
high have the highest fertility, whereas those countries where the degree of gender 
equity in family-oriented institutions is lower, experience lower levels of fertility.
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There are several parallels between these theories on fertility and Esping-An-
dersen’s framework on familialization and de-familialization, which is also recog-
nised by the authors themselves (Rindfuss et al. 2003: 415; McDonald 2000a: 1, 
2002: 429). Indeed, role compatibility and gender equity are basically de-familializa-
tion in disguise: In all theories, family policy which eases the welfare responsibilities 
of the family is identifi ed as a key determinant of high fertility. Consequently, a very 
similar critique as that which has been targeted towards the concept of de-familial-
ization can be targeted towards the role incompatibility thesis, as well as to gender 
equity theory. For example, all three theories in essence exemplify Pfau-Effi nger’s 
(see section 2) description of an evolutionary approach to social policy where the 
changes in informal care and different developmental paths of the welfare states are 
ignored and the focus is instead placed on the ways in which the different countries 
support women’s labour market participation. As I see it, the minor attention given 
to informal care and to the ways in which it is organised considerably weakens the 
analytical power of the frameworks discussed above. To put it differently, the theo-
ries do not take into consideration that a low degree of role compatibility and gen-
der equity might mean completely different things in different countries, and that 
this might in turn have different consequences for fertility. Moreover, the increases 
in role compatibility and gender equity can take different paths, each of which might 
infl uence fertility differently.
One way to understand these diffi culties which arise from the lack of a profound 
consideration of informal care is to consider these theories in the light of the frame-
work of Leitner (2003) discussed above. To briefl y repeat the argument, Leitner dis-
tinguishes between strong and weak defamilialization and familialization, respec-
tively. This distinction results in a framework in which family policy can be classifi ed 
into four different types (Table 2): Strong familialization and strong de-familializa-
tion (optional familialism), weak de-familialization, but strong familialization (explicit 
familialism), strong de-familialization, but weak familialization (de-familialism), and 
weak familialization and weak de-familialization (implicit familialism).
If the arguments put forward by the supporters of the role incompatibility the-
sis, and by McDonald, are considered in the light of Leitner’s framework, it is not 
very clear what, for example, a low degree of role compatibility and a low degree 
of gender equity in family-oriented institutions mean. In this case, are we dealing 
with explicit or implicit familialism, or with both alternatives? After all, the degree of 
role compatibility and gender equity in the family-oriented institutions is low in both 
Tab. 2: Leitner’s (2003) framework on familialism
 
Familialization De-familialization 
 Strong Weak 
Strong Optional familialism Explicit familialism 
Weak De-familialism Implicit familialism 
Source: Table 1 in Leitner (2003: 358).
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cases, yet in the fi rst case the state supports the family in its caring function (explicit 
familialism), whereas in the other case the state lets the family survive on its own 
resources (implicit familialism). A classic example here would be the low degree 
of childcare provision in the conservative welfare states (weak defamilialiazation), 
but generous tax support for male breadwinner families as well as in generously 
compensated long leave periods, for example in Germany (strong familialization), 
and the lack of such tax support and shorter, poorly-compensated leave periods in 
Greece (weak familialization). Despite the common denominator of a low degree of 
role compatibility, defamilialization and gender equity, it appears logical that fertility 
is affected differently by family policy in these two countries.
The same logic applies to the rising level of de-familialization: The theories of 
role incompatibility and gender equity assume that any increase in the degree of 
role compatibility or gender equity in the family-oriented institutions leads towards 
higher fertility. Yet it is not clear whether the increases in the level of de-familializa-
tion, on the one hand, or familialization, on the other, infl uence fertility differently, 
or do so to differing degrees. For example: An increase in childcare supply increas-
es the level of role compatibility and gender equity in family-oriented institutions 
(strong defamilialization), but does this increase infl uence fertility in a similar way 
and to a similar extent as an increase in parental leave periods and compensation 
(strong familialization)?
These problems naturally do not challenge the core claims made by the support-
ers of these theories as to the positive impact of generous reconciliation policies on 
fertility. However, a further specifi cation of these theories might result in a better 
understanding of the causal mechanisms between family policy and fertility, and 
thus of the cross-country differences in fertility.
4 Towards an integrated approach
The introduction of the gendered welfare state perspective on demographic theo-
ries on childbearing can probably contribute to a better understanding of fertility 
behaviour. However, even though the theoretical frameworks on fertility discussed 
above have signifi cantly increased our understanding of the infl uence of micro and 
macro level factors on fertility, none of them has provided us with a comprehensive 
explanation of the variations in fertility between the countries. Thus, it is reasonable 
to ask whether a further step should be taken towards a combined theory. One of 
the many possibilities to take an integrated approach is outlined below. The sugges-
tion of combining elements from both sides of the research is not new, but compa-
rable considerations have been articulated for example by McDaniel (1996), Neyer 
(2006), as well as by González and Jurado-Guerrero (2006). The approach taken 
in this paper differs from the earlier attempts in that it also introduces women’s 
heterogeneous preferences and systematically discusses the way in which these 
preferences in different welfare states transform into different choices in terms of 
employment and family.
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4.1 From preferences to career strategies
According to the preference theory by Hakim (1998, 2000, 2002, 2003a/b), women 
today have better possibilities to lead the kind of life they want, due to several his-
torical changes which have contributed to a new scenario (contraceptive revolution, 
equal opportunities revolution, expansion of white-collar occupations, employment 
opportunities for secondary earners, and the increasing importance of attitudes, 
values and personal preferences when it comes to the choices made about life-
style). Consequently, both the variation in women’s fertility and labour market par-
ticipation can be explained with the heterogeneity in women’s lifestyle preferences 
when it comes to employment and childbearing. 
Hakim further argues that it is possible to distinguish between three different 
groups of women based on their preferences: The majority group (40-80 percent of 
the female population) consists of adaptive women who either wish to combine work 
and family without giving priority to either of them, or have unplanned careers and 
drift in a sense that they do not have a clear idea of how they want to lead their lives. 
These women are highly responsive for example to employment and social policy, 
as these policies infl uence working conditions and the degree of role compatibility. 
A minority of women (10-30 percent of the female population) are home-centred. 
The primary aspiration of these women is to devote themselves to homemaking, 
and they usually have large families. Their employment choices are not affected by 
employment policy (as they prefer not to work, at least not when their children are 
young), but their fertility is partly determined by social policy, as it infl uences family 
income, which in turn infl uences fertility. Finally, another minority group of women 
(also 10-30 percent of the female population) is work-centred. For these women, 
work is their fi rst priority and they only have children, if it is possible in the context 
of their work. Consequently, and contrary to the other two groups of women, work-
centred women are not very responsive to social or family policy. The sizes of the 
preference groups vary between the countries, as the policies normally support one 
group of women at the expense of the others. This, according to Hakim, is also the 
reason for low fertility; when women are not supported in their preferred lifestyles 
by the government, they have fewer children than they would like to have.
The preference theory is found to be problematic, both when it comes to theory 
and practice. Several researchers have, for example, accused Hakim of ignoring the 
fact that preferences alone do not explain women’s employment patterns but that 
women’s work orientations are a sum of nationally and culturally different oppor-
tunities and constraints (Crompton/Harris 1998a/b; McRae 2003a/b). Furthermore, 
Pfau-Effi nger (2004) has pointed out that Hakim has not made it clear why women 
choose different labour market careers than their preferences would suggest, as 
well as why different types of preference have evolved in the fi rst place, and why 
an individual woman chooses one preference group over the others. Moreover, at 
the theoretical level it is diffi cult to draw a demarcation line between the different 
preference groups (McRae 2003a: 333), whereas at practical level it has proven to 
be diffi cult to distinguish between the groups using the existing survey material 
(Hakim 2003c). The studies support the idea that preferences have an impact on 
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women’s employment patterns at least to some extent, but the interplay between 
preferences and constraints (Doorewaard et al. 2004; Crompton/Lyonette 2005; Kan 
2007; Kangas/Rostgaard 2007; Debacker 2008; Gash 2008), as well as the complex 
association between attitude formation and behaviour (Steiber/Haas 2009), is un-
derlined. Moreover, the employment status and work preferences of mothers with 
children under school age are found to correspond poorly in most of the countries 
(Beets et al. 1997; Evans/Kelley 2001; Hakovirta/Salin 2006; Wall 2007). Also, the evi-
dence indicates that women who prefer to have one to two children usually prefer 
market employment, whereas women who desire larger families more often wish 
to concentrate on homemaking or work part-time (Lee/Gramotnev 2006). Vitali et al. 
(2009) in turn fi nd that in the European countries there is an association between 
employment-childbearing preferences and realised fertility behaviour, whereas no 
link can be found between preferences and fertility intentions.
All in all, then, although it is clear that more research is needed in order to es-
tablish a detailed understanding of women’s lifestyle preferences, in the light of the 
present evidence it appears reasonable to assume that, as suggested by Hakim, 
women have differing preferences when it comes to childbearing and employment. 
It further appears reasonable to assume that by studying these preferences it is pos-
sible to group women into the three different groups of home-centred, adaptive and 
work-centred. The starting point of the current framework is thus that, as suggested 
by Hakim, women have heterogeneous preferences. One of the strengths of this 
approach is that it acknowledges that women within and between the countries are 
not to be treated as one homogeneous group with similar kinds of desires, but that 
we should expect variation in the responses to, for instance, public policy. Moreo-
ver, the theory guides us in the identifi cation of the different groups, and allows us 
to make suggestions about their relative size in each population.
Even though the assumption about the heterogeneity of women’s preferences is 
warranted, the above literature overview shows that it is not obvious how strongly 
these preferences infl uence behaviour. What the fi ndings of the cited studies do 
show is that women are also heterogeneous when it comes to labour market par-
ticipation and to fertility. Heterogeneity of behaviour is discussed for example by 
Bernhardt (2000: 10), who divides women into three different groups according to 
their “lifetime career strategies in relation to childbearing”. The fi rst of these strate-
gies is “career strategy”, and it is chosen by women who engage in a demanding 
career. Given the demanding career, careerists often remain childless or only have 
one child. The second group of women, according to Bernhardt, chooses a “combi-
nation strategy”, that is these women are interested in staying in employment, but 
are also willing to restrict their employment when they have children. Bernhardt fur-
ther states that these women have more children if society is family-friendly. Finally, 
the third group of women chooses a “homemaking strategy”, which means that they 
choose homemaking, or at least long periods of homemaking, after the fi rst child is 
born. This group of women also usually has more children than those who choose 
the career or combination strategies.
Considering the evidence for and against the preference theory, as well as that 
on women’s heterogeneous choices when it comes to fertility and employment, it 
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appears plausible to assume that the preferred lifestyles are constrained to some 
degree. It can be similarly assumed that, given the constraints and preferences, 
women need to make different lifestyle choices when it comes to employment 
and fertility, and that  women consequently end up with realising, at least roughly 
speaking, either the career strategy, the combination strategy or the homemaking 
strategy. These different categories proposed by Bernhardt are convenient, as the 
association between the different preferences and strategy groups is straightfor-
ward: Home-centred women prefer the homemaking strategy, adaptive women the 
combination strategy and work-centred women the career strategy. However, as 
the preferences remain an important determinant of lifestyle choices, it can be fur-
ther postulated that when faced with constraints, and if she needs to choose a ca-
reer strategy not in line with her initial preference, an individual woman will choose 
the strategy which bears the closest resemblance to her original desires. In other 
words, only in a very particular situation will, for example, a home-centered woman 
who cannot realise the homemaking strategy choose the career strategy instead of 
the combination strategy.
To understand the relations suggested above, it is helpful to think in terms of 
distributions (Fig. 1). What Hakim basically argues is that the range of women’s pref-
erences varies from exceptionally home-centred to exceptionally work-centred, and 
that three different groups of women can be distinguished within this range. Ac-
cording to Hakim’s theory, the three different groups are suffi cient to capture the 
most important aspects of the variation between women, but it is basically possible 
to divide the female population into even a larger number of groups (e.g. ten groups 
based on deciles). Hakim furthermore gives some loose suggestions concerning the 
skewness (the relative size of the different groups) of the distribution. According to 
her, basically any combination from a positively skewed distribution, where 30 per-
cent of the women are home-centred women, 60 percent adaptive and 10 percent 
work-centred women, to a negatively skewed distribution, where 10 percent of the 
women are home centred, 60 percent adaptive and 30 percent work centred, is pos-
sible. However, she does not make any comments on the kurtosis (how homogene-
ous we can expect the women within the three different groups to be).
In a similar manner, we can understand women’s career strategies as a distribu-
tion where we fi nd women who basically never work (homemaking strategy in its 
extreme form) at one end and at the other those women who continuously work 
full-time (career strategy in its extreme form). In between these two extreme types, 
we fi nd women who divide their time at home and employment differently. Unlike 
Hakim, Bernhardt does not make any numerical suggestions as to what the distribu-
tion of the women might look like. The shape of the distribution (that is the size of 
the different groups of women as well as the homogeneity within the groups), both 
when it comes to preferences and to career strategies, is naturally ultimately a mat-
ter for empirical investigation.
My suggestion is to link these two theories or distributions together. Were work-
family choices to be solely determined by preferences, the distribution based on 
preferences would be identical with the distribution based on the chosen career 
strategies. However, because of different constraints that limit women’s opportuni-
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ties, the preference distributions and career strategy distributions are not congru-
ent. Below I will argue that family policy as well as household resources determine 
the way in which the preference distribution transforms into career strategy distri-
bution to a large extent.
4.2 Welfare state policies, household resources and women’s career 
strategy choices
What kind of contextual factors help or hinder women in realising their preferences, 
and thus infl uence the way in which the preference distribution transforms to ca-
reer strategy distribution? Welfare state researchers, labour market specialists and 
demographers have pointed out that for example the tax system (Gustafsson 1992; 
Dingeldey 2001; Apps/Rees 2004), parental leave regulations (Rönsen 2004; An-
dersson et al. 2006; Lalive/Zweimüller 2009), child care supply (Oláh 2003; Uunk et 
al. 2005; Baizán 2009) and the possibility to work part-time (Del Boca 2002; Lewis et 
al. 2008) infl uence women’s labour market participation and fertility and shape the 
opportunity structures. These macro-level factors might have an impact on both the 
number of women who choose a certain strategy and on how the different strate-
gies are realised. For instance, some adaptive women might see long periods of 
part-time work as a means to realise the combination strategy, whereas other adap-
tive women realise the same strategy by taking a very long parental leave. Further, 
as there are signifi cant differences between the welfare states when it comes to 
family policy, it is reasonable to assume that in different countries the preference 
distributions transform to career strategy distributions differently and to a differing 
degree.
In addition to welfare state policies, household resources such as fi nancial as-
sets (wage, income, inheritance) and the number of family members and relatives 
who can share the burden of childcare with the mother are important for women’s 
choices. For instance: Family income can infl uence the possibilities to buy good 
Fig. 1: From preferences to career strategies
Source: own design
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quality childcare, whereas care provision from family members, in turn, is particu-
larly important for working mothers when welfare state support for childcare is in-
adequate or childcare is expensive. Finally, even childbearing itself can act as a con-
straint. Under some circumstances (e.g. expensive child care), an adaptive woman 
might therefore be able to realise the combination strategy by part-time work, but 
once she has her second child the combination becomes too costly and she has to 
opt for homemaking instead.
Table 3 shows data on the above variables for selected countries (except for part-
time work, as indicators on part-time work measure the number of women working 
part-time rather than the actual availability of part-time employment). The number 
of full-rate equivalent parental leave weeks (column 1) and the maximum length of 
leave for the mother (column 2) show in particular whether and how the choices of 
the adaptive women, and thus the combination strategy, are supported: The longer 
and better compensated the leave, the better the support for the realisation of the 
combination strategy by long inactive periods. The shorter and more poorly com-
pensated the leave, the more restricted the support for the combination strategy 
with long periods of inactivity, and the higher the incentives for a realisation of the 
career strategy, homemaking strategy or combination strategy with part-time work. 
As work-centred women who have children most likely wish to return to employ-
ment as soon as possible, the generosity or maximum length of leave periods is not 
likely to infl uence their decisions to any great extent, given that all countries provide 
for the possibility for at least brief leave periods. Homemakers, however, are likely 
to benefi t from long and generous leave periods.  
Enrolment in childcare for children under three years of age (column 3) as well 
as the average hours spent in daycare (column 4) in turn say something about the 
state support for adaptive and work-centred women: The higher the enrolment ra-
tios and the number of hours in care, the better the support for the combination 
strategy and career strategy with children. The lower the enrolment ratios and the 
number of hours in care, the more incentives there are for work-centred women to 
stay childless. Further, the lower the enrolment ratios and hours in care, the more 
incentives there are for adaptive women to realise either the combination strategy 
by limiting their fertility (as it might be diffi cult to fi nd formal or informal childcare 
for several children) or choose the homemaking or career strategy. In consequence, 
if the combination strategy is too diffi cult or even impossible to realise, adaptive 
women might need to choose between having children and remaining inactive, or 
not having children but work.
The structure of the tax system shows in particular whether and if so what kind 
of support is available for home-centred and adaptive women. The tax rate for a 
family where only one of the spouses is in full-time employment (column 6) is an 
indicator of the disposable income of the family: The lower the tax rate, the higher 
the disposable income of the one-earner family and the better the possibilities for 
homemaking or the combination strategy with long periods of inactivity. The higher 
the tax rate, the more pressure there is for the second earner to enter employment 
and thus more support for the combination strategy through part-time employment. 
The family privilege (column 7) is calculated by dividing the tax rate in column 6 
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by the tax rate of a single person without children (cf. Sainsbury 1999). The closer 
to the unit the ratio is, the less support there is for the one-earner family model, in 
other words for the homemaking strategy or the combination strategy with longer 
employment breaks. Likewise, the further away the ratio is from the unit, the higher 
the support for the homemaking strategy and the combination strategy with longer 
breaks from employment. In addition (columns 8 and 9), following OECD (2001: 142), 
we take a look at how much the net income of a two-child family with average earn-
ings (100-0) increases if the other spouse decides to work short part-time hours 
(100-33) or long part-time hours (100-67). The closer the net income increase is to 
the gross income increase (133 and 167 respectively), the more incentives there are 
for the second earner to enter employment, and the better the support for the reali-
sation of the combination strategy by employment. The lower the income increase, 
the higher the incentives for the homemaking strategy or the combination strategy 
with longer inactive periods.
As to the household resources, it is diffi cult to fi nd applicable macro level data 
and consequently only the net costs of childcare are included as a percentage of 
family income for a dual earner family with two children (column 5). Childcare costs 
are likely to give some indication of how much the strategy choices of adaptive and 
work-centred women in particular are infl uenced by household income: The higher 
the costs, the more likely it is that the choices are determined by income. For exam-
ple, adaptive women on a low wage might be attracted to homemaking if the costs 
of childcare make employment unbenefi cial.
The outcomes which are generated by the different opportunity structures are 
shown in Table 4. Even though the outlined theory concentrates on women’s het-
erogeneity, and in essence requires to be tested with longitudinal micro level data, 
some trends can even be distinguished from the macro-level data. Employment 
patterns among couple families with youngest child aged between 3 and 5 (columns 
1-4) gives information on the actual choices women make concerning employment 
and family. The parity-adjusted total fertility rate PATFR (or TFR), and PATFR1 (or 
TFR1) (columns 5-6) in turn indicate the level of total and fi rst birth fertility. Finally, 
the proportion of live births by rank of the children (columns 7-9) sheds some fur-
ther light on fertility trends.
To organise the data and the discussion, Esping-Andersen’s typology is em-
ployed. As the review of the gendered welfare state literature in section 2 shows, 
there is no consensus on how the countries cluster in terms of family policy. Howev-
er, given that the results from different studies during the past two decades overlap 
relatively well with Esping-Andersen’s typology, his framework is employed here 
for its overall clarity.
4.2.1 Social democratic countries
In social democratic countries, family policy works in favour of the combination 
and career strategies at the expense of the homemaking strategy. Adaptive women 
can rely on the generous parental leave arrangements which enable mothers to 
stay home for long periods without worrying about losing their jobs (the FRE leave 
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varies from roughly 32 weeks in Denmark to almost 39 weeks in Norway, and the 
time rights are even more generous, particularly in Finland and Norway). At the 
same time, extensive, affordable childcare4 enables mothers, regardless of their 
household income, to return to work without diffi culties related to the organisation 
of childcare. Thus, adaptive women are able to combine work and the preferred 
number of children relatively well, even though they may face constraints such as 
low local availability of part-time work, which in addition to the childbearing pref-
4 Enrollment rates in Finland are considerably lower, but according to the Finnish legislation the 
municipalities have to organise childcare for all children below the age of three (Välimäki/Rau-
hala 2000). The low enrollment rates thus do not signal a limited supply, but rather a limited 
take-up.
Tab. 4: Indicators of employment patterns and fertility
 
Employment patterns among couple families 
when the youngest child is aged 3-5 (%)a 
Fertility rate Proportion of live 
births by rank of 
childrenf 
 
Both full-
time 
One parent 
full-time 
One parent 
full-time, 
other part-
time 
Other Total First birth 1 2 3+ 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Social democratic         
Denmark - - - - 1.84e - 43 37 20 
Finland 63 19 12 7 1.87b 0.79b 42 33 25 
Norway - - - - 1.98c 0.87c 43 35 21 
Sweden 33 15 43 9 1.94b 0.87b 45 36 19 
Conservative          
Austria 15 27 51 8 1.41b 0.73b 47 35 18 
Belgium 32 23 36 9 1.86e - - - - 
France 46 24 22 8 1.99e - - - - 
Germany 13 30 47 10 1.38d 0.68d 49d 34d 17d 
Greece 47 44 6 3 1.52c 0.74c 47 38 15 
Italy 30 42 22 6 1.41e - - - - 
Netherlands 4 20 62 14 1.79b 0.83b 45 37 18 
Portugal 67 22 7 4 1.41b 0.86b 53 35 11 
Spain 38 40 17 5 1.39c 0.77c 57 33 10 
Liberal          
Australia 21 30 40 9 1.90e - - - - 
Canada - - - - 1.67b 0.78b - - - 
Ireland - - - - 2.07e - - - - 
UK 19 28 43 11 1.94e - - - - 
USA - - - - 2.14b 0.88b - - - 
Notes: a data for approximately 2007; b data on PATFR for 2009, except for Canada and 
the USA for 2007; c data on TFR for 2009; d data on TFR for 2008; e data on TFR for 2009; 
f data for 2008, except for Denmark for 2005.
Source: a, e, f OECD (2012); b Human Fertility Database (2012); c author’s calculations 
based on data from Eurostat (2012); d Kreyenfeld et al. (2010). 
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erences, the costs of children and household income limit their fertility. Further-
more, especially due to the good availability of affordable childcare work-centred 
women can have children without childbearing needing to interfere too much with 
their career plans, and consequently the level of childlessness is likely to be low. 
The homemaking strategy is not supported to any large extent, except for Denmark 
where the family privilege is relatively high and the second earner’s employment is 
discouraged. In other countries, homemaking is costly and diffi cult to realise, and 
many home-centred women are likely to opt for the combination strategy. Those 
home-centred women who choose the homemaking strategy are likely to be either 
a group of women whose household income is high enough to enable homemaking, 
or whose marginal income is low, or who have very strong preferences for home-
making. For these women, as for homemakers in general, the level of fertility can be 
assumed (as suggested by the economic theory on fertility) to depend on childbear-
ing preferences, on the direct costs of children, as well as on household income.
As to the outcomes, data on women’s employment patterns only exist for Fin-
land and Sweden. The relative share of mothers in employment is highest in these 
two countries in the cross-country comparison and the number of one earner fami-
lies is the lowest. Notice, however, that it is common in Finland for both partners 
to work full-time, and the role of part-time work is marginal, whereas in Sweden it 
is almost the other way around. A somewhat larger share of women in Finland are 
inactive, which is likely to be due to the extensive time rights connected to leave. In 
other words, the data suggests that in Sweden women even realise the combination 
strategy often through part-time work, whereas in Finland the combination strategy 
is mainly realised by prolonged inactive periods followed by a return to full-time 
employment. As to childbearing, all four Nordic countries experience relatively high 
levels of fertility. However, the levels of fertility are lowest in Denmark, which disa-
grees with the theoretical framework given that Denmark gives the best incentives 
for all women to choose as they desire. The explanation of this discrepancy might 
be related to the lifestyle and childbearing preferences of Danish women. Rates for 
fi rst birth fertility are high for both Norway and Sweden, but are considerably lower 
for Finland. In all countries the share of fi rst births from the total is relatively low 
(from 42 percent in Finland to 45 percent in Sweden), which indicates that many 
women have more than only one child. Notice further that particularly in Finland the 
share of higher-order births is relatively high, which might be related to the higher 
share of inactive women: Combination through inactivity might favour larger fami-
lies than combination through part-time work.
4.2.2 Conservative countries
There is a general bias in the conservative cluster towards the homemaking strategy, 
and this strategy is accordingly chosen by home-centred women as well as by many 
adaptive women. Homemakers are likely to have a large number of children, which 
means that the parity progression ratios to higher birth orders are probably higher 
in the conservative than in the social-democratic country cluster. Some adaptive 
women are able to realise the combination strategy, but need to rely extensively 
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on childcare provided by their friends and relatives. Indeed, even though childcare 
services are relatively affordable, the scarce availability of them means that the 
compatibility of work and family is diffi cult regardless of the household income. 
Consequently, households resources in terms of childcare provided by relatives and 
friends are likely to play a crucial role. If this kind of care is not available, homemak-
ing becomes an attractive choice. Moreover, a majority of work-centred women, 
as well as some adaptive women, are likely to choose the career strategy without 
children, which results to a relatively high degree of childlessness.
Even though a common general pattern can be identifi ed, there is a consider-
able variation between the countries in how the mechanism works. Both in Austria 
and Germany the limited childcare supply and very long leave periods enforce and 
encourage homemaking, even for adaptive women. The tax system in Germany ad-
ditionally reinforces the homemaking strategy, but in Austria the tax system encour-
ages part-time work. Also in Greece, the lack of childcare enforces homemaking, 
but support for adaptive women is even more limited than in Austria and Germany 
as FRE leave is relatively short. Moreover, the tax system incentivises women’s em-
ployment and leaves homemakers without support. As to the outcomes, a signifi -
cantly higher share of mothers in Austria and Germany are inactive in comparison to 
the social democratic countries. Those women who are in employment mostly work 
part-time, and in accordance with the tax incentives, part-time work is somewhat 
more widespread in Austria than in Germany. In Greece, in turn, there is a strong po-
larisation between those mothers who work full-time and those who stay at home, 
and the role of part-time work is rather marginal. The level of total and fi rst birth 
fertility is low in all countries, and the share of fi rst-rank births is somewhat higher 
than in the social democratic countries. In other words, the data suggests that many 
women choose the career strategy without children, and those women who choose 
the combination strategy limit the number of children they have.
For Italy and Spain, it is primarily the restricted length of well-compensated pa-
rental leave combined with the considerable male breadwinner bias in taxation that 
makes homemaking benefi cial for both home-centred and for adaptive women. At 
the same time, childcare supply is better in these countries than in Austria, Greece 
and Germany, which gives somewhat better possibilities for adaptive and work-
centred women to live according to their preferences. As to realised behaviour, 
the share of inactive mothers in Italy and Spain is at the same levels as in Greece, 
which suggests that many women in these countries indeed relatively often opt for 
homemaking or the combination strategy by longer inactive periods. The share of 
part-time working women is lower than in Austria and Germany, whereas the share 
of full-time working women in turn is relatively high. Thus, whereas in Austria and 
Germany it is mainly the restricted supply of daycare services that force women to 
choose the homemaking strategy and part-time work, the somewhat better daycare 
supply in Italy and Spain appears to allow the women to choose the career strategy 
with full-time work to a larger extent, and the restricted leave periods force them to 
do so. Notice further that both the total and fi rst-birth fertility rates in Spain are low, 
and a high share of the births are of fi rst rank. In other words, the data suggests that 
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many women choose to realise the career strategy by staying childless or by only 
having one child.
Portugal deviates from the patterns in these two countries. Even though family 
policy structures are relatively similar to those in Italy and Spain in that the leave 
periods are short and there is a male breadwinner bias in the tax system, the avail-
ability of daycare services is relatively good. As to the outcomes, mothers’ full-time 
employment is even more popular in Portugal than for example in Finland and the 
share of inactive women is likewise at the same level as in Finland. The role of part-
time work, in turn, is very marginal. Moreover, even though the level of total fertility 
is low, the level of fi rst birth fertility is relatively high. Over 50 percent of the births 
are fi rst births, and only 11 percent third or higher are order births. In other words, 
Portuguese women appear to a very large extent to choose the career strategy with 
only one child.
In Belgium and France, in turn, the male breadwinner bias in the tax system ena-
bles home-centred women to choose the homemaking career, but at the same time 
the good availability of affordable childcare in both countries and the long generous 
leave periods in France enable adaptive and work-centred women to choose ac-
cording to their preferences. However, the length of the leave periods is more lim-
ited in Belgium, which means that Belgian adaptive women are attracted to realise 
the combination strategy by part-time work to a larger extent than adaptive women 
in France. The activity data shows that the share of inactive women is indeed slight-
ly higher than in the social democratic countries (as the possibilities to realise the 
homemaking strategy are better) but lower than for example in Austria, Germany 
and Greece (as adaptive women are not forced to choose the homemaking strategy 
but have good possibilities to opt for the combination strategy). Further, the share 
of part-time working women is higher in Belgium than in France, which is in ac-
cordance with the family policy incentive structures. The higher share of full-time 
working mothers in France in turn suggests that many women realise the combina-
tion strategy by longer inactive periods and return to full-time employment. Finally, 
the fertility rates in both countries are at the same level as in the social democratic 
countries, but there is unfortunately no available good quality data on the level of 
fi rst birth fertility or the distribution of the births by birth order.
In the Netherlands, there is some bias towards homemaking created by the fam-
ily privilege in taxation. However, in general the tax system encourages part-time 
work, the relatively short leave periods provide incentives for adaptive women to 
realise the combination strategy by part-time work and the availability of part-time 
childcare is likewise relatively good. Consequently, the share of inactive mothers is 
somewhat lower than in Belgium and France, but still higher than in Sweden and at 
the same level as in Finland. However, the extremely high share of part-time work-
ing mothers (62 percent), accompanied with a very low share of full-time working 
mothers, cannot be explained with the incentive structures alone. One possibility is 
that the career strategy is not a very popular alternative among Dutch mothers, or 
that having children is not very popular among work-centred women. In any case, 
the huge popularity of the combination strategy is likely to be the main reason be-
hind the high total and fi rst birth fertility. 
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4.2.3 Liberal welfare states
In the liberal countries, there is some support for each career strategy, but women’s 
possibilities to choose according to their preferences often depend on household 
resources. The family taxation shapes the constraints by favouring one earner fami-
lies and the homemaking strategy, which makes the homemaking strategy easily 
available for the home-centred women. Given the lack of well-compensated paren-
tal leave and publicly provided childcare, but the good availability of privately pro-
vided, expensive childcare, the career strategy choices of adaptive and work-cen-
tred women are likely to depend heavily on the initial resources of the family. Many 
adaptive women can choose the strategy they desire by buying childcare from the 
market (or by relying on help from their friends and relatives). For those adaptive 
women who cannot afford market-based childcare, or obtain help in childcare from 
friends and relatives, homemaking becomes an attractive alternative. Indeed, even 
though the enrolment rates in the liberal countries are at the same levels as in many 
of the conservative countries, the reason for the low enrolment is likely to be dif-
ferent. That is, in the conservative countries the low enrolment rates are probably 
due to the limited supply of public childcare, whereas in liberal countries the low 
enrolment rates indicate the limited take-up at current high prices. However, some 
adaptive women, due to the short compensated leave, might realise the combina-
tion strategy by working part-time, whereas some might even opt for the career 
strategy. Finally, many work-centred women are able to have children according to 
their preferences due to the availability of private childcare, and hence the level of 
childlessness is likely to be low, or in other words at the same levels as in the so-
cial democratic cluster. Consequently, the overall level of fertility is relatively high. 
There are some exceptions from these general patterns. Most notably, the amount 
of FRE leave in Canada is somewhat longer than in the other countries, the tax 
system in the UK encourages short part-time work rather than homemaking, and 
childcare costs are relatively low in Australia.
As to the outcomes, it is diffi cult to obtain a good picture of what is going on 
in the liberal countries as there is only a very limited amount of data available. The 
fertility rates are high in all countries except for Canada. Data on fi rst-birth fertility 
is only available for Canada and the USA, and shows that part of the reason for the 
low Canadian total fertility is the relatively low level of fi rst-birth fertility. On the 
other hand, fi rst-birth fertility is relatively high in the USA. The data on women’s 
employment for Australia and the UK in turn indicates that women’s realised behav-
iour corresponds relatively well to the incentive structures. In accordance with the 
generous incentives for homemaking, the share of inactive women is at comparable 
levels to Austria and Germany for example. As could be expected based on the 
limited possibilities to take leave, the share of part-time working mothers is likewise 
relatively high and indicates that the combination strategy is often realised by part-
time work. Notice furthermore that many mothers work full-time, which suggests 
that a relatively high share of the mothers choose the career strategy. 
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5 Previous research on fertility, family policy and women’s 
employment revisited
How useful is the framework outlined above when it comes to understanding the 
previous research on the determinants of childbearing? As to the relationship be-
tween employment and fertility, there is a relatively robust fi nding on the positive 
infl uence of inactivity on fertility across the welfare states (see section 3.1). This is 
consistent with the above framework, given that homemakers and combiners are 
frequently inactive for longer periods and likewise have more children than career-
ists. Further, the results from the meta-analysis conducted by Matysiak and Vignoli 
(2008) show that the negative infl uence of employment on childbearing increases 
by parity and is strongest in the liberal and conservative countries, but weaker in the 
social democratic countries. These too are results which we would expect based 
on the outlined framework. The fi rst fi nding on the increases in the negative infl u-
ence of employment by parity basically tells us that homemakers (who are inac-
tive for very long periods) and combiners (who are frequently inactive for relatively 
long periods), have a higher propensity to continue childbearing than the careerists 
(who are inactive only very seldom and shorter periods) who often stay childless or 
have only one child. The second fi nding is also partly in accordance with the claim 
put forward above: Since the social democratic welfare states create good circum-
stances for combiners and careerists (that is, for working mothers) to have children, 
the negative effect of employment on fertility should be smaller in this country clus-
ter than in the conservative countries.
It is further interesting that the results on the infl uence of part-time and full-time 
employment on childbearing vary depending on the welfare state. No signifi cant dif-
ferences in the impact of part-time and full-time work on childbearing is found in the 
social democratic context (for second and third births in Sweden, see Hoem/Hoem 
1989; for second births in Sweden, see Oláh 2003; for second births in Denmark, 
see Brodmann et al. 2007). However, in the Netherlands (Liefbroer/Corijn 1999) as 
well as in Western Germany and in the UK (for second births, see Kreyenfeld/Zabel 
2005) part-time working women have a higher propensity to have children. This is 
consistent with the discussion above: In the Scandinavian countries where gener-
ous parental leave enable longer breaks from employment and where the daycare 
supply makes it possible to return to full-time employment, adaptive women realise 
the combination strategy both by working full-time and part-time, which might ex-
plain why no major differences are detected between part-time and full-time work-
ing women. However, in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, where part-time 
work is the main means for adaptive women to realise the combination strategy and 
where full-time working mothers are careerists to a greater extent, it is logical that 
a positive infl uence of part-time work on fertility is found. 
Concerning family policy and fertility, many studies fi nd that childcare – regard-
less of the welfare state context – exerts a positive infl uence on fertility (see Kravdal 
1996 for third births in Norway; Del Boca 2002 for childbearing in Italy; Oláh 2003 
for the intensity of second births in Sweden; Bonoli 2008 for the level of fertility 
in Switzerland; Baizán 2009 for fi rst and higher order births in Spain; Rindfuss et 
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al. 2010 for the level of fertility in Norway). Likewise, several studies conclude that 
parental leave extensions, extensions of so-called care leaves, or increases in com-
pensation for such leave periods, have a positive impact on fertility (for the timing 
of third births in Austria, see Hoem et al. 2001; for the timing of second and third 
births in Norway, see Aassve/Lappegård 2009; for the positive effect on both tempo 
and quantum in Austria, see Lalive/Zweimüller 2009). Since adaptive and work-cen-
tred women are responsive to the availability of childcare, and since adaptive and 
home-centred women are responsive to the generosity of the parental leave, the 
results are consistent with the framework. Notice also that the positive infl uence of 
maternity leave extensions in Finland is found to increase by parity (Rønsen 2004). 
A likely reason is that extensions in the leave periods create better conditions par-
ticularly for home-centred and adaptive women, who respond by having a higher 
number of children, whereas work-centred women who often only have one child 
are not infl uenced by these changes due to the already good possibilities to realise 
the preferred strategy. 
As to the domestic division of unpaid household work, there are several studies 
which show that a more equal division of unpaid work at home has a positive infl u-
ence on fertility (for second births in the USA, see Torr/Short 2004; in Germany, see 
Cooke 2004; in Denmark, see Brodmann et al. 2007; in Spain and Italy, see Cooke 
2008), or that the probability of continued childbearing is higher when the father 
takes parental leave (for second births in Sweden and Hungary, see Oláh 2003; for 
second and third births in Sweden, see Duvander/Andersson 2006). One interpreta-
tion of these results is that the elevated birth risks indicate a higher propensity of 
adaptive women to proceed to higher parities if they have a supportive spouse who 
helps them to realise their preferences smoothly. However, Torr and Short (2004) 
report that those families where the women do a large majority of the household 
work also have a higher propensity of second births, and Cooke (2004) shows that 
the more the women spend time on childcare, the higher the risk of second birth. In 
other words, these results indicate that homemakers who are likely to spend most 
time on household responsibilities have higher propensity to continue to higher 
parities. Further, Duvander and Andersson (2006) point out that the risk of a birth 
in terms of mother’s parental leave take is inverted U-shaped for the second births 
(e.g. the risk is lowest for those mothers who take out least and most leave) and 
J-shaped for third births. The low propensity of second births for mothers who 
only take short leave periods in connection with their fi rst birth can probably be at-
tributed to the careerists, who are likely to take the shortest leaves and often have 
only one child. Likewise, the J-shaped pattern for third births clearly indicates that 
homemakers and combiners who are likely to take the longest leave also have the 
highest propensity to continue to higher parities. However, it is not clear why long 
leave periods in connection with the fi rst birth would lead to a lower propensity of 
second births, or why short leave periods in connection with the second birth would 
lead to a higher propensity of third births. 
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6 Concluding remarks
In the fi rst part of the paper, I discussed some ways in which demographers may 
benefi t from gendered research on the welfare state. However, many perspectives 
on fertility which, for example, emphasise the role of values (van de Kaa 1987, 2002; 
Lestaeghe/Surkyn 2004), as well as the way in which past fertility and population 
structures infl uence current fertility ideals and decisions (Lutz/Skirbekk 2005; Lutz 
et al. 2006) were excluded from this overview. Thus, in addition to the above men-
tioned topics and subjects, there might be several other ways in which demog-
raphers will fi nd the research conducted by welfare state researchers benefi cial. 
Further, the above review is relatively rough, and future contributions on the topic 
should be more detailed. Finally, it needs to be pointed out that even though the cur-
rent paper concentrates on the lessons that demographers might be able to derive 
from welfare state research, an equally important question is naturally what welfare 
state researchers can learn from demographers. All in all, a further discussion be-
tween these two disciplines is recommended.
The second part of the paper outlined a new framework which emphasises the 
role of preferences, family policy and household resources in women’s decision 
making. In other words, the framework only concentrated on a handful of variables, 
even though the research on the determinants of fertility has identifi ed even sev-
eral other variables which are at play when decisions about childbearing are made. 
However, individual level variables such as values (van de Kaa 2001), number of own 
siblings (Murphy/Knudsen 2002; Kreyenfeld 2004), own (Adsera 2006) and parents’ 
religion (Branas-Garza/Neuman 2006; Berghammer 2009), as well as other similar 
attributes which are found to infl uence fertility, might partly operate through prefer-
ences by having an impact on women’s lifestyle desires. Other factors, for instance 
the level (Kreyenfeld 2002, 2004) and fi eld (Hoem et al. 2006a/b) of education, which 
have an impact on fertility, might in turn be determined at least to a certain degree 
by lifestyle preferences. Finally, some factors, such as diffi culties to fi nd a spouse 
(Tanturri/Mencarini 2008), infertility or confl icting preferences on the number of 
children with the spouse (Voas 2003) naturally also infl uence the individual wom-
en’s choices, and may even add to substantial patterns in the overall population. 
However, not all women do face these problems and circumstances, but all women 
make their choices within those structures which are determined by family policy 
and household resources. To put it differently, the point I want to make here is that 
in order to understand the cross-country differences in fertility we need to recog-
nise the heterogeneous preferences of women, understand how the contextual fac-
tors shape women’s lives and carefully study how the preferences transform into 
choices. How other variables relate to this “big picture” is not unimportant, but it 
is unlikely that factors such as choices about educational fi eld or confl icting prefer-
ences with the spouse would be signifi cantly different or more common in some 
countries than in others, and such variables are thus likely to have less explanatory 
power on fertility differences between the countries.
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